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CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS' LAST HOPE: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR KYSAR
James A. Henderson,Jr.* & Aaron D. Twerski**
The authors agree with ProfessorKysar that the current version of the
consumer expectations test for design defectiveness isan amorphous, unprincipled misreadingof section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
And they agree that most courts apply risk-utility balancing in determining
design defectiveness. But they disagree with Kysar's proposal to supplement
risk-utility balancing with a reinvigorated consumer expectations test based
on expert testimony regardingwhat consumers actually expect in the way of
design safety. Judicial reliance on such testimony would be susceptible to
result-orientedmanipulationby litigants, would not guide manufacturers in
making sensible design choices, would pressure courts to exceed the limits of
their institutional competence, and would undermine the new Restatement's commitment to making products safer. In the final analysis, Professor Kysar's suggested approach to design liability rests on an unworkable
premise, implicit in his article, that the authors reject-that enterprise liability is a worthy, attainablegoal toward which courts should strive.
INTRODUCTION

Having served as Reporters for the Products Liability Restatement,1 we
offer a brief response to Professor Kysar's proposal to supplement its design liability provisions with a "reinvigorated" consumer expectations test.
His article is beautifully written and forcefully argued. Unquestionably,
he makes the best case possible for reformulating the consumer expectations test in product design litigation. Indeed, he has forced us to consider our positions carefully and, in several respects, provide clarification.
Nevertheless, we have serious reservations regarding Professor Kysar's
proposal. We believe that he overstates the need for a revitalized consumer expectations test and understates the serious problems that his
proposal would generate.
I.

WHERE WE AGREE

Certainly we agree with Professor Kysar's assessment of the current
version of the consumer expectations test. He refers to the version currently advocated by plaintiffs' lawyers as "a gross misreading of [sec* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., 1959, Princeton
University; LL.B., 1962, LL.M., 1964, Harvard University.
** Newell DeValpine Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B., 1962, Beth
Medrach Elyon Research Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D.,
1965, Marquette University.
1. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. (1998) [hereinafter Third
Restatement].
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tion 402A]," "amorphous," "unprincipled," and "decidedly inferior." 2
Coming from a scholar who believes that the Third Restatement's risk-utility
test is inadequate and who offers his own version of consumer expectations as a necessary supplement, these are strong criticisms. Any openminded observer who finds Kysar's analysis persuasive can reach but one
conclusion: The consumer expectations test as it is currently advocated
by a handful of academics and most of the plaintiffs' bar is an unprincipled, intellectually bankrupt approach to design-based liability that only a
proponent of unrestricted liability could knowingly embrace. We also
agree with Kysar's reading of the relevant case law. In this respect, quite
apart from the fact that his reading coincides with our own, his treatment
of decisional developments up to the present is the most lucid, coherent
account to date. He concludes that a clear majority of American courts
apply risk-utility analysis in determining whether product designs are defective, and that many American courts that appear to recognize an independent consumer expectations test are, upon closer examination, applying risk-utility principles. Finally, we agree that a few jurisdictions do
seem firmly committed to consumer expectations as the primary test for
judging product designs.
II.

WHERE WE DISAGREE

Beyond these significant areas of agreement, it should come as no
surprise that we disagree with Professor Kysar's proposal on several
grounds. In essence, Kysar objects to the Restatement's exclusive reliance
on risk-utility analysis in determining design defectiveness. Risk-utility
analysis is incomplete, he argues, because it ignores the rich, contextual
ways in which lay persons perceive and evaluate risks. By this process of
"spare instrumentalist balancing,"5 the Restatement allows technological
expertise to triumph over populist values and perceptions. Product designs that would clearly be rejected by the moral intuitions of a majority
of American consumers are deemed acceptable under risk-utility analysis.
Kysar's solution to these shortcomings takes the form of judicial reliance
on empirical work by experts in cognitive psychology who he claims can
measure the actual perceptions and beliefs of American consumers about
product-related risks. In his view, when these experts are able to testify
credibly, courts should allowjuries to accept their testimony as setting the
legal standards for judging product designs. Kysar would continue to apply risk-utility analysis to support liability when consumers expect less
safety than risk-utility requires; but when consumers are shown to expect
more safety, he would allow liability to follow even if the manufacturer
had no technologically feasible way to make the product safer. (He refers
to this double whammy in his proposal by the more dignified term, "twin
2. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1701,
1705, 1707, 1746 (2003).
3. Id. at 1774; see also id. at 1736-39.
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test."4 ) Approaching design liability in this expanded manner, he asserts,
will allow the populist values of the American public to find expression in
court and, ultimately, prevail over the domination of technology.
Our first disagreement with Professor Kysar's proposal concerns its
reliance on the expertise of cognitive psychologists in setting design standards different from those set by risk-utility analysis. We doubt that the
"concrete, robust findings from psychologists '5 that he envisions will actually be sufficiently forthcoming to support consistent application of his
reinvigorated consumer expectations test. In an article published more
than a decade ago describing the inherently lawless nature of failure-towarn litigation, we suggested greater reliance on the expertise of behavioral experts as one possible way to help solve the difficulties of indeterminacy presented by an essentially vacuous, rhetorical tort.6 Courts do
not appear to have followed our suggestion, however, and in the design
defect scenario, we would urge them not to follow it. In our previous
article, we contrasted failure-to-warn with design defect litigation. Design
defect litigation, we argued, is an arena in which technological rigor
makes consistency possible. Requiring proof of specific alternatives, supported by relatively hard, physical science, saves design defect litigation
from slipping into rhetorical lawlessness. 7 In our view, Kysar's proposal
to substitute soft, behavioral science for hard, physical science as a solution to what he sees as technological dominance under the Restatement
would seriously undermine the integrity of design litigation and would
send that branch of products liability law in the same lawless direction
that the failure-to-warn branch seems destined to travel.
Responding to one legal scholar's published criticisms of a leading
cognitive psychologist's portrayal of consumers' "rival rationality," Professor Kysar suggests that it is premature to reject such a rationality at this
point." Perhaps that is true in the Platonic world of psychological paradigms, but we strongly caution courts against adopting a liability standard
based on actual consumer expectations in the hope that the psychological expertise necessary to support such an approach will be forthcoming.
We doubt that it will. Moreover, even if such a rival rationality were discernible as a general proposition, we have difficulty envisioning how it
could ever be made to work fairly and consistently in design litigation.
Would the necessary empirical research be conducted in a manner aimed
specifically at the design issue before the court? How could judges ever
hope to distinguish solid research from expert-for-hire rubbish? And
how could manufacturers, when they make design decisions, anticipate
4. Id. at 1705.
5. Id. at 1790.
6. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 323-25 (1990).
7. See id. at 292-93, 298 (noting that design cases draw upon body of hard sciences to
run consistent risk-utility analyses).
8. Kysar, supra note 2, at 1776-79.
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what psychological survey analysis might reveal years later, when those
design decisions are attacked in court?
For the sake of argument, let us assume that something like the rigorous psychological expertise that Professor Kysar anticipates does materialize. What then? We believe that he has overstated the extent to which
technology dominates human values in the Restatement's risk-utility approach, and that he has failed to demonstrate the need for his suggested
legal reform. To be sure, the first part of the Restatement's test-that a
reasonable alternative design be shown to have been available that would
have reduced the product's foreseeable risks-involves a risk-utility analysis in which the manufacturer's exposure to liability is confined within
the realm of the practically feasible. In that connection, the relevant variables are relatively "hard" and the judge's role as screener of evidentiary
sufficiency dominates. The modifier "reasonable" in the phrase "reasonable alternative design" is intended to allow softer variables to be taken
into account, but the judgment called for in the first part of the test is
admittedly more technical than normative.
By contrast, the second part of the Restatement's risk-utility
test-whether omission of the safer alternative renders the defendant's
design not reasonably safe-is clearly more normative than the first part;
the variables are "softer," and juries are given considerable leeway to
reach nuanced decisions. Indeed, once the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of a reasonable, safer alternative, the Restatement is largely
indifferent to exactly how the jury in a design case should be instructed.
Moreover, while the Restatement approach rejects consumer expectations
as an independent test for defective design, evidence regarding consumer expectations is relevant on both the "reasonable alternative" and
the "not reasonably safe" issues, and may even be controlling in the plaintiff's favor. 9 Given the open-textured nature of jury decisionmaking
under the Restatement, we are puzzled by Professor Kysar's assertion that
the Restatement approach confines the jury within a world of technologybased uniformity. His proposal, as much if not more than ours, confines
juries in that manner. To be sure, Kysar's preferred technology-derived
from cognitive psychology-concerns what consumers expect in the way
of design safety, and thus appears to be more consumer-oriented. But
the jurors' task under Kysar's approach is largely to determine as a matter
of fact what consumers desire, not to decide what they, the jurors, desire.
In most cases, the jury's task will be simply to decide whether or not to
accept the expert's opinion. Kysar's approach never does explicitly give
jury members the freedom to incorporate their own values into decisionmaking the way the Restatement does. Thus, at least from the jury's perspective, Kysar's proposal is as susceptible as ours to the criticism that the
approach allows technology to dominate over populism.

9. See Third Restatement, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. g.
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Another way that Professor Kysar arguably misinterprets the Restatement's approach to design defects concerns his support for what we refer
to as "product-category liability.""' When he says that his new version of
consumer expectations would support liability even when no reasonable
alternative design is available to the manufacturer, by definition he is proposing the imposition of liability on whole categories of products. He
implies that the Restatement approach, by not allowing the true attitudes
of consumers to set the standard for such liability, condones as socially
acceptable products that consumers actually regard as loathsomely unacceptable. But as comments d and e to its design section make clear, the
Restatement denies category liability in such cases not because it deems
such products socially acceptable-clearly they are unacceptable-but
because courts are believed to be inappropriate institutions to be making
such categorical judgments regarding social acceptability. 1 It follows
that when psychologists under his proposal tell juries that consumers perceive certain categories of products to be contemptibly unacceptable,
they are not telling juries anything they do not, intuitively, already know.
Thus, we object to Professor Kysar's willingness to embrace category
liability, not because it introduces new substantive grounds on which to
condemn product categories as unacceptable, but because it violates the
norm against courts overstepping their proper institutional limits. Comment e recognizes that such outlier judicial responses are possible, and
suggests they should occur, if at all, in rare instances when the loathsomeness of certain product categories is particularly egregious rather than
12
when a psychologist tells the jury something they already know full well.
In response to our position regarding institutional limits, Kysar might argue that juries are not reaching normative judgments but merely making
findings of fact about what consumers actually expect. But that would
belie his insistence that juries reach nuanced decisions, and ignores the
reality that "factfinding" under his proposal would unavoidably be affected to some extent by normative elements. And certainly, when courts
incorporate jury decisions into their categorical tort judgments, they are
imposing norms on product sellers.
Two further aspects of Kysar's promotion of category liability deserve
brief mention. First, his willingness to allow courts to reach decisions
about the social undesirability of entire categories of products reflects a
certain degree of elitism. He claims to be siding with populist values in a
struggle against powerful industrial technology, but he relies on the least
populist branch of government-the courts-to reject entire product cat10. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263, 1297
(1991).
11. See Third Restatement, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d.
12. See id.
unreasonable ...

design.").

§ 2 cmt. e ("[Tlhe designs of some products are so manifestly
that liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative
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egories. And he does this in a way that constrains juries to follow a different sort of technology in exercising their factfinding responsibilities. By
contrast, the Restatement defers the policy issue of categorical acceptability
to the more populist-oriented branches of government-the legislative
and executive branches. '3 In the cases of marginal (rather than categorical) defectiveness that belong in court, the Restatement gives jurors the
freedom to incorporate a variety of factors in determining liability. 14 In
the end, by emphasizing the negative qualities of risk-utility analysis, Professor Kysar leaves design defect liability to the whims of a few academically-oriented experts who, through the medium of relatively soft technology, will be only too happy to tell jurors what Americans really want.
The second aspect of Kysar's endorsement of categorical liability that
deserves mention is his twin-test approach, in which what consumers actually expect trumps technology when elevated expectations support liability, but is itself trumped by technology when lower expectations would
negate liability. In his plan, expectations serve as a sword, but not as a
shield. This strikes us as self-contradictory. Once Professor Kysar convinces the reader that the actual, concrete values and expectations of consumers deserve to trump technology and control liability outcomes, why
should those values and expectations not hold sway whichever way they
cut from a liability standpoint? We suspect that part of his agenda in
advocating this twin-test approach is to move the design liability system
closer to what he refers to at the outset of his article as "'enterprise liability'"-strict liability, or "absolute manufacturer liability" without a requirement of defect.' 5 His apparent fondness for that doctrine, implicit
in this article and explicit in his previous work, 16 may explain his willingness for courts to impose category liability. Enterprise liability is certainly
part of his explanation of how manufacturers will respond rationally to
the mixed signals sent by his twin-test approach. According to Kysar,
manufacturers will not necessarily withdraw products from the market
that expose them to the double whammy of being liable no matter which
design alternative they choose; they may simply pay the no-fault liability
tax and get on with their business.' 7 Finally, the enterprise liability principle may explain Kysar's willingness to impose liability based on assessments of consumer perceptions at the time of trial-assessments to which
manufacturers could not have had access when making their design deci13. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14. See Third Restatement, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. f.
15. Kysar, supra note 2, at 1708.
16. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1554-55 (1999) (arguing that
system of enterprise liability would best combat market manipulation of consumers and
increase product safety).
17. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 1785; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1557
(arguing that tinder enterprise liability, manufacturers of relatively dangerous products
will simply charge more to bear increased liability costs).
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sions. On his view, liability is aimed not at explicitly guiding corporate
conduct, but at internalizing the social costs of that conduct.
III. KysAR's

CONCRETE EXAMPLES:

AIR BAGS, BLACK TALONS,

AND TOBACCO

Perhaps the best way to illustrate our objections to Professor Kysar's
proposal is to examine briefly the three concrete examples that he uses to
show how his approach would reach more desirable outcomes than
would be reached under the Restatement. As will be made clear, we have
some difficulty seeing how these examples support his thesis. Of the
three, the one involving competing air bag designs is the most novel and
the only one that involves judicial application of the Restatement's concept
of reasonable alternative designs.' Professor Kysar posits two competing
air bag designs, A and B, each of which saves the lives of 3,000 automobile
occupants over a given period of use. Over the same period, design A
unfortunately kills 100 adult occupants who would have survived without
the device, and design B kills 90 occupants. Kysar correctly observes that,
from a risk-utility standpoint, design B is preferable to design A because it
provides the same benefits as A and kills fewer people. Moreover, the
availability of design B to the manufacturer of design A would presumably
render design A defective under the new Restatement. Kysar then introduces the wrinkle that the 100 lives lost under design A are divided
equally among adult men and women, but that the 90 lives lost under
design B are mostly women. He implies that the Restatement's risk-utility
test is committed to the earlier conclusion that design B is preferable and
design A is defective-under risk-utility, after all, lives are lives-but that
under his new approach, design A might not be defective if an expert
testified that consumers actually prefer design A, although riskier overall,
because of its gender neutrality. Thus, Kysar seems to be implying that
the reinvigorated consumer expectations test would approve a product
design (design A) that the Restatement test would automatically condemn.
This is interesting, but it does not accurately reflect the Restatement's
likely treatment of the competing air bags situation. Consider the case of
an action against the manufacturer of design A by a plaintiff who represents a male occupant killed by that design. Under the Restatement, the
plaintiff would point to design B as a reasonable alternative and would
reach the jury with the claim. However, contrary to Professor Kysar's apparent assumption, liability does not automatically follow under the Restatement. In answering the further question of whether the defendant's
omission of design B rendered design A not reasonably safe, the jury
would presumably hear the same expert testimony about the reasons for
consumers' preferences for design A and would be allowed to reach the
18. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 1768-69.
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same nuanced outcome of nondefectiveness that Kysar appears to
prefer. 19
Now let us consider a different variation of the air bag example, one
that bears out Kysar's conclusion that the consumer expectations test and
the Restatement test would reach opposite results. Suppose that the plaintiff represents a female occupant killed by design B, the one that kills
mostly women. Can the plaintiff rely on design A as a reasonable alternative design and use it to condemn design B as "not reasonably safe"? At
first blush, having just considered the mirror-opposite version involving a
male occupant, one might answer in the affirmative. Given that the Restatement would allow a jury in the first variation to consider gender neutrality to justify the adoption of design A, one might assume that it would
allow the same consideration in the second variation to condemn design
B as defective. Closer examination of the relevant Restatement language,
however, reveals this is probably not the case. In this second variation of
the air bag example, we believe that the plaintiff would suffer judgment
for the defendant as a matter of law. This outcome is not a result of the
reasonableness concept upon which the outcome rested in the first variation. Rather, it is a result of the requirement in section 2(b) that adoption of the plaintiff's proposed alternative design must reduce or avoid the
foreseeable risks posed by the product.20 Because design A is not safer than
design B from an overall safety standpoint, the plaintiff in the second
variation arguably should lose as a matter of law. By contrast, the plaintiff
in the first variation reaches the jury because his alternative, design B, is
safer overall.
Of course, one might argue that the risk reduction language of section 2(b) should be read to refer to the risks to the particular victim
class-in our second variation, women-of which the plaintiff's decedent
was a member. For women, air bag A is a safer design. But comment f to
section 2(b) contains language emphasizing that "safety" means "overall
safety," making such an argument more difficult. 2 1 Admittedly, comment
fs "overall safety" language could be construed to allow the female victim's claim to reach thejury-that portion of comment f could be read to
refer to the types of risks to any given victim class, not to comparisons
across classes. On balance, however, we do not believe that courts should
read the Restatement in this manner. The requirement that the plaintiff's
reasonable alternative design be safer than the defendant's design, all
risks considered, is a bedrock principle in the Restatement's treatment of
19. Ironically, of course, Kysar's twin-test rule, coupled with his sterner vision of riskutility, would probably deny the manufacturer of design A this expectations-based shield,
and thus would condemn air bag A as defective, even though the consumer expectations
part of his analysis would favor the contrary outcome. This is the self-contradictory aspect
we puzzled over earlier.
20. See Third Restatement, supra note 1, § 2(b).
21. See id. § 2 cmt. f ("When evaluating the reasonableness of a design alternative,
the overall safety of the product must be considered.").
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design defectiveness. To allow juries to deem designs defective that are
actually safer than the alternative designs upon which plaintiffs rely,
based on considerations such as gender neutrality, would seriously undermine the Restatement's objective of promoting greater product safety
rather than promoting other, albeit important, social interests at the cost
of safety.
Along with its endorsement of category liability, this is the aspect of
Professor Kysar's proposal that we find most troubling. Our concern is
that, under his plan, as long as an expert psychologist can convince ajury
that consumers are willing to accept less overall automobile safety in exchange, say, for better gas mileage (an environmental consideration), a
plaintiff injured by a safer but less fuel-efficient automobile might be allowed to recover damages based on proof that consumers disapprove of
the manufacturer's decision to adopt a safer but less fuel-efficient alternative-assuming, of course, that the plaintiff can satisfy Professor Kysar's
proximate cause requirements. We anticipate that Professor Kysar would
argue that the air bag example pits safety-to-women against safety-to-men
in the context of treating men and women equally and, unlike increased
fuel efficiency, raises a "safety" issue. But regardless of how one frames
the issue, the simple fact is this: Relying on what expert psychologists say
about actual consumer expectations, Kysar would condone harming one
victim class in order to help another victim class, even when overall safety
is thereby reduced, all in the name of social interests such as gender neutrality or environmentally-motivated fuel efficiency.
It is not the notion of tradeoffs among classes of consumers, as such,
that bothers us-that is what risk-utility is all about, and we would allow
the jury in the first air bag variation to deny plaintiffs recovery on that
ground. Rather, it is the proposition that such tradeoffs may condemn a
design as defective even when the alternative design proposed by the
plaintiff would diminish the aggregate safety of all accident victims. We
reject the idea of trying to accommodate a more sensitive, politically acceptable outcome in that admittedly unusual case 22 by allowing courts in
the run of cases to redefine "safety" in ways that actually increase overall
product risks. Kysar's proposal strikes us as highly susceptible to manipulation across the run of cases, and would open every product design to
attack on what are, from a safety standpoint, tangential policy grounds.
We believe that the "overall safety" approach in the Restatement will lead
to a better mix of outcomes in the long run, even if it seems to sacrifice
some worthwhile interests in the short run. As we have indicated, the
relevant language in the Restatement could be construed to allow for
Kysar's preferred outcome in the second variation of the air bag example,
but we urge that it not be so construed.

22. Although Professor Kysar insists the example is "not entirely implausible," he
admits it is "purely hypothetical." See Kysar, supra note 2, at 1768 n.282.
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Professor Kysar's second example, based on Black Talon bullets,
moves us away from considerations of safer alternative designs.23 The victim of a shooting incident sues the manufacturer of the type of bullet
used in the shooting, a Black Talon, that is deliberately (and viciously)
designed to maximize the destruction of human tissue upon impact with
the victim's person. The plaintiff cannot establish a reasonable alternative design because ordinary bullets lacking the unique destructive feature are not, by definition, acceptably close substitutes for the
superdestructive Black Talons. Thus, under the Restatement, the plaintiff
would be seeking to impose category liability and would be denied as a
matter of law. A court might give effect to comment e to section 2 (b) and
allow liability under a "manifestly unreasonable design" exception, but
that is admittedly an unlikely response. Kysar suggests that under his new
approach, expert testimony would be available to show that most Americans, in fact, abhor the Black Talon design, and the plaintiffs claim
would be allowed on that basis. The clear implication of Kysar's analysis
is that, under the Restatement's risk-utility analysis, all deaths are alike and
the hollow-point bullets are no more objectionable than any other lifethreatening ammunition. Only under Kysar's approach would the defendant's bullets receive the legal treatment they deserve.
Our problem with this analysis is that, as explained earlier, the reason the Restatement would reject category liability on these facts is not that
hollow-point bullets are socially acceptable. Clearly they are not, and
courts do not need expert psychologists to tell them that. Instead, the
Restatement rejects category liability because it is believed to be beyond the
proper bounds of judicial competence to make such categorical riskutility decisions. On the widely accepted view reflected in the Restatement,
questions of social acceptability of that sort are broad policy questions
that do not lend themselves to being adjudicated and should be left to
more politically accountable branches of government that are institutionally competent to make such decisions. Once again, Kysar might argue
thatjuries under his approach are not making policy decisions but merely
determining what consumers expect as a matter of fact. Notwithstanding
Kysar's efforts to constrain juries to a factfinding role, however, their
"findings" will inevitably involve some measure of normative decisionmaking. Indeed, Kysar explicitly refuses to require juries to base their findings of what consumers expect on expert testimony, or even to require
plaintiffs to introduce expert testimony, leaving juries, implicitly at least,
24
to reach their findings of fact based in part on their own intuitions.
23. See id. at 1767.
24. See id. at 1774 n.309 (concluding that the issue whether to require plaintiff to
introduce expert testimony "is better left to the courts"). As mentioned earlier, we believe
that the Restatement's reasonable alternative design approach gives jurors more leeway to
rely upon their own values than does Kysar's plan. See supra text accompanying note 14.
However, the Restatement's requirement that plaintiffs first prove the existence of a feasible
alternative design carefully restricts the scope of jurors' normative decisionmaking, and
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Moreover, regardless of how jurors reach decisions under Kysar's approach, judges will exercise legislative power when they give effect to
those decisions in their categorical judgments, and neither judges nor
jurors are politically accountable for the broad policies they are thereby
implementing.
Professor Kysar's third example, based on tobacco products, involves
another highly controversial product category that is much on the minds
of regulators these days. 25 He correctly observes that reasonable alternative designs are not available to plaintiffs in these tobacco cases and correctly concludes that design-based liability under the Restatement is available, if at all, only under comment e's "manifestly unreasonable"
exception. After describing a litany of reprehensible marketing behavior
by tobacco companies that the Restatement would presumably refuse to
take into account in assessing the manifestly unreasonable nature of tobacco products under comment e, he concludes that, since such behavior
manipulates consumer perceptions of the relative safety of tobacco products, it should be subject to design-based liability. Under his version of
the consumer expectations test, it would be.
Once again, as Professor Kysar appreciates, he is urging courts to
impose category liability on controversial products. We will not repeat
here our objections to category liability based on the inappropriateness
of courts making such policy decisions. What interests us most about
Kysar's tobacco products example is that it reveals an analytical trap that
often arises in discussions of design defect liability: the assumption that
all manner of manufacturers' bad conduct must somehow be addressed
under the heading "design defectiveness." Even assuming that the marketing behavior Kysar describes should bring tort liability, such liability is
no less significant when imposed under the headings "failure to warn,"
"misrepresentation," or "consumer fraud." The Restatement would prefer
to deal with errant corporations under those more straightforward auspices than to stretch design defectiveness, via the new consumer expectations rubric, to include inappropriate marketing practices. Of course,
these other branches of products liability law impose their own requirements that plaintiffs must meet, and allowing tobacco claims under an
expanded version of category liability better serves the implicit objective
of enterprise liability. Thus, bringing a suit under one of these other
claims may not be as attractive to proponents of expanded liability. Still,
recent case law suggests that courts are indeed imposing liability for the
marketing behavior Kysar describes, on doctrinal bases other than defec26
tive design.
therefore prevents juries from deciding broad policy questions. Kysar's approach provides
no such ex ante constraint.
25. See id. at 1769-71.
26. See, e.g., Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing
widow to recover from cigarette manufacturer on theory of fraud for husband's smokingrelated death), adhered to on reconsideration, 51 P.3d 670 (refusing to reduce punitive
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CONCLUSION

At bottom, the difference between our view of product design liability and Professor Kysar's view is that we insist that the plaintiff introduce
proof of a safer reasonable alternative design in every case not falling
within one of several important exceptions, and he does not. Unlike the
current consumer expectations test, which he rejects as hopelessly vague
and unprincipled, he suggests a version based on cognitive psychology
that, at least by comparison, offers some hope of methodological rigor.
While we have grave misgivings on the question of whether the psychological expertise would be able to deliver what he asks of it, we are ready
to assume for argument's sake that it might. Even so, we fail to see the
need for a new version of consumer expectations. Kysar has overstated
the narrow-mindedness of the Restatement approach, and he has understated the problems that his version of what we view as category liability
would bring. Not only would his version of category liability encourage
courts to exceed their institutional capabilities, but also it would lead to
unacceptable levels of indeterminacy. As we have explained, much of our
concern relates to comparative institutional competence. Perhaps our
five-year stint as Reporters to the Restatement project has caused us to be
overly concerned with the formal aspects of products liability law. But if
ex-Reporters do not worry about the formal structures of that subject,
who will?
damages), review denied, 61 P.3d 938 (Or. 2002), vacated, 2003 WL 21020159, at *1 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 2003) (remanding in light of holding on excessive punitive damages in State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003)).

